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ABSTRACT
This study develops an intertemporally linked market model to explore the relationships
between price-cost margins, market concentration, and advertising outlay. The study used
data from 48 four-digit SIC (standardized industrial classification) codes for the Food and
Tobacco Processing Industries during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. The authors’ findings
provide evidence that both high and low levels of performance provide signals to industries to
consolidate, but for obvious and different reasons. Further, increased consolidation leads to
increased entry barriers (advertising) and higher profits to the industry. Our findings are
supportive of both Chicago and Traditionalist Schools of thought about antitrust
enforcement: Neither emerges in a dominant position. Endogeneity issues and findings within
the intertemporal structure cast considerable doubt about overly simplistic structure–perfor-
mance paradigms of firm behavior. [JEL Code: L11, L40, L66].r 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
1. INTRODUCTION
Over 60 years ago, the paradigm known as Structure–Conduct–Performance (SCP)
was forwarded by Bain (1951) as a formal model to explain the behavior of firms in
an industry. Associated with the Harvard Tradition, this new approach came to
replace the old case-study approach. The primary distinction of SCP from case
studies was in the way researchers looked at data. The SCP approach relied on cross-
sections of industry data, insisting that industries are shaped by some basic
conditions: demand elasticities, product durability, and technology, which determine
the market structure: number and size of firms, entry conditions, product
differentiation, and vertical integration, which lead to conduct: pricing, advertising
and R&D strategies, which, in turn, determine market performance: efficiency,
equity, and technological change.
High rank correlations across industries in different developed countries suggested
that tastes and technology, which are likely to be constant across regions, determine
the equilibrium structure. Researchers in the 1950s through the 1970s produced
numerous marquee articles that regressed price-cost margins (PCMs) with variables
such as industry concentration, minimum efficient scale (MES), capital intensity,
R&D, and quadratic- (inverted U-) shaped effects from advertising to sales ratios
(see Collins & Preston, 1969 and Kwoka, 1979 for excellent reviews of the literature
and relevant findings). Market concentration was generally found positively related
to higher PCMs, which confirmed the emerging conventional wisdom portended by
Bain. Support for the inverted U-shaped role of advertising was also found, which
suggested waning competition from new entry and even for incumbent market share
once an industry was sufficiently concentrated. Armed with convincing evidence of
concerns about concentration, U.S. antitrust authorities took an aggressive stance
during the 1960s and 1970s on mergers, predatory pricing, and resale price
maintenance, while ushering in premerger notification laws and stepped up
information reporting.
According to Reder (1982), the opposing Chicago School view, which emerged in
the 1970s, laid its initial foundations shortly after World War II. Reder points to the
arguments of Pareto efficiency, articulate lay communications by Chicago scholars,
and the vacuum of free-market thought in the wake of the U.S. depression as major
contributing forces that gave the Chicago School momentum for its rise. The
Chicago technical critique of the SCP approach is derived from its efficiency
undergirdings and lies primarily in the SCP treatment of concentration as a purely
exogenous variable. When this does not hold, the error term in the SCP regression is
correlated with concentration and the ordinary least squares (OLS) properties of the
model are lost (biased parameters, asymptotically biased parameters, efficiency,
asymptotic efficiency, consistency). Indeed, it could be that industry structure, prices,
and profits are simultaneously determined. The Chicago School provided a related
critique. If several firms in an industry are very efficient, they may earn large rents on
their efficiency and also grow their market shares. Industries with a few such efficient
firms will be concentrated and this concentration is derived not by high prices but
low average costs for some firms. Demsetz (1973, 1974) and others estimated
versions of the following equation using firm-level data:
Pif ¼ b0 þ b1Ci þ b2sif þ bZþ eif ; ð1Þ
where P is the performance (profit or PCM) of firm f in industry i, C is
concentration, s is market share, and Z is a vector of other relevant exogenous
variables. Although they usually found that the parameter on concentration was
almost never significant and positive, the coefficient on market share was significant,
which lent considerable support to the Chicago critique. Antitrust authorities in the
1980s and 1990s shifted attention toward the economic benefits of lower costs (i.e.,
efficiency) and looked harder for ways in which concentrated industries could be
forced to price competitively. Theories arriving from a plethora of game theory
contexts broadened our understanding of the firm behavior and the new empirical
industrial organization emerged to provide a framework for the testing of structural
based market power for specific industries.
In this article, we conducted research on the premise that both the Traditionalist
School (TS) and Chicago School (CS) have redeeming merits. Our methods flow
from work by Kambhampati (1996, pp. 133–148) and also from Delorme, Klein,
Kamerschen, and Voeks (2002) [hereafter DKKV]. Both studies use a system of
simultaneous equations similar to Strickland and Weiss (1976) and extend beyond
Martin’s (1979) early use of intertemporal relations between structure, conduct and
performance. Even after Martin’s pathbreaking work, numerous TS studies
bypassed the known intertemporal relationships with simple contemporaneous
systems, for examples, Gupta (1983), Schmalensee (1989), and Weiss (1991).
1. Study focus: The present study focuses on partitioning the FKPT industries into
low and high advertising categories. DKKV considered a broader set of industries
and they used firm data available in the Compustat database (Standard & Poor’s,
McGraw-Hill, New York, NY). The problem with using Compustat data lies in
that potential biases might arise when considering only publicly traded firms.
2. Lagged terms: Our data set spans five census years (1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, and
1992) and lagged variables are contained in the census years.1 The DKKV study
used data in 1982, 1987, and 1992, but adopted lagged variables from just the
previous year.
1See section 5 for discussions on issues of more recent data.
Many of the basic ideas founded by the TS are not in conflict with CS. For 
example, both schools of thought have long recognized that basic market 
characteristics such as minimum efficient scale help to determine market structure. 
The key difference, as alluded to above, is that CS thought hinges more closely on 
the role that firm level performance may have on structure while the TS focus is 
on the role that structure has on performance. The history of TS thought before 
Martin (1979) was principally that performance had no feedback role on changing 
the structure. In our setup, we are able to evaluate the simultaneous role that 
industry performance has on structure and vice versa.
The research was conducted on the 48 Food and Kindred Product and Tobacco 
(FKPT) industries defined by the U.S. Census Bureau’s 4-digit SIC (standard 
industrial classification) codes during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Average market 
concentration in the FKPT industries increased significantly over the past 50 years. 
As a result, about 40% of the FKPT industries are commonly considered to be 
highly concentrated, as defined by four firms controlling 60% or more of sales 
(Mueller & Rogers, 1980, 1984; Rogers & Tokle, 1995). To date, a number of studies 
have examined market structure–performance relationships in the FKPT industries 
(see Rogers, 2001, and citations therein). These studies have used various measures 
of profits and/or industry PCMs to measure profit performance, and most were 
conducted using data for years before 1980. Critically, these studies are purely in the 
TS format: Performance is restricted from having a role in determining structure. In 
the present article, we investigated the simultaneous, intertemporally linked 
relationships among performance (PCMs), structure (market concentration), and 
conduct (advertising outlays). To date, no cross-sectional study of the U.S. FKPT 
industries have considered the potential for intertemporal relations in a simulta-
neously determined system.
Kambhampati (1996) and DKKV assert that each variable in the SCP model 
influences the other variables in a time-dependent manner. Kambhampati (1996) 
argues that (a) structure is affected by lagged conduct and both lagged and current 
performance, (b) past conduct represents a potential barrier to entry, (c) improving 
past and current performance leads to more concentrated structures, (d) previous 
year’s performance influences the current conduct, and (e) performance determinants 
remain contemporaneous as the profits are computed in the current period. In this 
study, we explore the intertemporal interrelations suggested by Kambhampati (1996) 
and DKKV. Although our modeling framework follows closely to that of DKKV, at 
least four major differences are noteworthy:
3. Concentration on advertising: Following Greer (1971), Cable (1972), and
Strickland and Weiss (1976), we examine whether the effect of concentration
on advertising takes an inverted-U shape. DKKV restricted their model to
consider only a linear relationship.
4. Minimum efficient scale (MES): We incorporate MES to model the effect of scale
of economies in the analysis (Connor et al., 1985; Sutton, 1991). The DKKV
study lacked the data to include MES in the analysis.
To evaluate the relationship among PCMs, market concentration, and advertising
properly, a simultaneous-equation model is needed to obtain consistent and
unbiased estimates. For this study, we estimated the simultaneous-equation system
using two-stage least squares (2SLS). The rest of this article is organized as follows.
The simultaneous-equation framework is presented and discussed in
Section 2. The empirical setup and data used in this study are discussed in
Section 3. Section 4 contains the result from three regressions. Finally, Section 5
provides concluding remarks and suggestions for further research.
2. THE MODEL
Following Kambhampati (1996) and DKKV, the intertemporal system of equations
presumes three endogenous variables: industry concentration (CR4), advertising
(AD), and industry price-cost margins (PCM). Each of the system’s equations are
developed and discussed below.
Beginning first with industry structure, we are interested in evaluating the role of
current and past performance and potential barriers to entry in shaping the industry
level concentration. The equation is written:
CR4t ¼ a0 þ a1ADt1 þ a2KOt1 þ a3PCMt1 þ a4PCMt þ a5MESt1
þ a6MESt þ Z1t; ð2Þ
where CR4 is the four-firm concentration ratio, AD is advertising intensity calculated
by the ratio of advertising expenditure to value of shipments, KO (capital-output
ratio) is gross fixed assets relative to value of shipments, PCM is the price-cost
margin, and MES is the minimum efficient scale. The subscripts t and t1 represent
current and lagged one period, respectively. All of the coefficients are expected to be
positive.
An important determinant of concentration may indeed be the MES defined as
smallest optimum firm size divided by a measure of market size. Three different
approaches are used for estimating the MES numerator: (a) economic-engineering
studies, (b) midpoint plant size as a proxy, and (c) plant size with the lowest labor
costs as a proxy. Using 13 four-digit SIC industries in the U.S. food and drink sector,
Connor et al. (1985) report that median plant estimates based on the 1972 Census of
Manufactures and engineering estimates over 1970–1980 are highly correlated
(r5 0.83; pp. 93–95). Therefore, we used the size of the industry’s median plant
divided by industry sales to be a proxy of MES. The median plant size is defined as
the size of the plant that is at the midpoint of the industry shipments size distribution
(Connor et al., 1985; Strickland & Weiss, 1976). Because MES represents the set-up
costs of installing a new plant, the impacts are likely to take time to impact industry
concentration; thus, we expect a5Za6.
The advertising intensity equation (second in our system) is given by:
ADt ¼ b0 þ b1PCMt1 þ b2GRt þ b3CR4t þ b4CR42t þ Z2t; ð3Þ
where GR is the growth in industrial production calculated as the ratio of
current year shipments to those in the previous period. Inclusion of the lagged
PCM variable follows from Sutton’s two-stage approach (1991, pp. 27–81),
Kambhampati (1996), and DKKV. Previous year’s profits are expected to have
impacts on current advertising expenditure; i.e., the more past profits, the more
current advertising outlays. In Greer (1971), Cable (1972), Comanor and Wilson
(1974), and DKKV, the growth of sales is incorporated to control for successful
new product development, positive demand shocks and/or greater levels of
advertising induced product differentiation. The coefficients b1 and b2, are expected
to be positive.
As investigated in Greer (1971), Cable (1972), and Strickland and Weiss (1976),
the effect of concentration on advertising takes an inverted U shape. Advertising
is expected to be increasing in concentration when concentration ratio is
low (Dorfman & Steiner, 1954), but decreasing at very high levels of
concentration when it becomes easier for firms to collude to avoid mutually
offsetting advertising. Therefore, in the advertising equation we add a quadratic term
(CR42) to capture this type of nonlinear relationship. An inverted U-shaped
relationship requires that the coefficient on CR4 be positive and that of CR42 to be
negative.
The equation for PCMs is essentially a performance measure that proxies industry
profits. Many empirical studies explain PCMs with variables for concentration,
advertising, and other cost related variables (see, for example, Collins & Preston,
1966, 1969; Kwoka, 1979; Liebowitz, 1982; Ornstein, 1975; Rhoades & Cleaver,
1973; Weiss, 1991). The quality of Census PCMs as a proxy for profits depends on
whether appropriate adjustments can be made to reflect critical elements of cost not
included in the Census PCMs of particular industries. In the food manufacturing
industries, the two most important costs associated with Census-derived PCMs are
the cost of advertising and promotion and the cost of capital. We address these
concerns by adding advertising intensity AD and capital intensity KO to the
equation. Although AD serves as a proxy for the production differentiation barrier,
MES represents the scale barrier. In addition, unanticipated increases in demand or
unanticipated decrease in costs might result in high margins. Output growth GR is
incorporated to reflect the effects.
The census concentration ratios do not characterize market concentration
correctly where markets are local or regional in nature because the ratios generally
refer to national industries. Following Rogers (2001), we add a dummy (NL) for a
local or regional industry, for example, milk or bread, to correct possible biases.
Additional barriers to entry can be observed when firms gain significant 
brand image from advertising or when firms operate in industries with high 
fixed costs. Therefore, lagged advertising and lagged capital investment are 
included in the model, and the associated coefficients are expected to be positive. 
The final two determinants of concentration include current and lagged PCMs. 
Inclusion of PCMs is suggestive of the meritorious incentives that profits might 
create in encouraging successful firms to grow and ineffective ones to shrink 
and/or exit.
Therefore, the PCM equation is given by
PCMt ¼ g0 þ g1GRt þ g2KOt þ g3CR4t þ g4ADt þ g5MESt þ g6NLþ Z3t: ð4Þ
As a final note, to account for other possible unobservable factors such as
aggregate demand shifts or technological change, we included a time trend variable
in each equation.
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE DATA
We used two-stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate the proposed simultaneous-
equation system. In the first stage, each endogenous variable (concentration,
advertising, and price-cost margin) is regressed on all exogenous variables, including
MES, lagged MES, capital-output ratio (KO), lagged KO, lagged AD, lagged PCM,
lagged GR, nonnational market dummy, and time trend. In the second stage, the
fitted values of endogenous variables from the first stage are used as instruments to
estimate the three structural equations. Throughout this article, the critical level for
determining strong statistical significance in a two-tailed test was established at the
5% level. We signified moderate statistical support with the significance level at 10%.
Except for advertising intensity and the local/regional dummy variables, all of the
variables used to estimate Equations 2–4 are derived from the 1972, 1977, 1982,
1987, and 1992 Census of Manufactures. The Census variables are for 48 four-digit
SIC FKPT Industries for each Census year. Thus, the data set contains 240
observations. Table 1 shows 48 four-digit SIC industries examined in this study. The
four-firm concentration ratios for three selected census years (1972, 1982, and 1992)
are also presented. Though the concentration ratio may increase or decrease for each
individual industry across different Census years, the average CR4 increased from
44.10% in 1972 to 46.21% in 1982, and finally to 53.90% in 1992. Simple
calculations of CR4 changes show the average concentration ratios increase
moderately over these periods. We will discuss more details on the trend of CR4
in the estimation of simultaneous-equation system below.
The media advertising data are from Competitive Media Reporting (CMR; Taylor
Nelson Sofres plc, London, UK). We match advertising data to corresponding
industries to create advertising-to-sales ratios in each Census year. The local/regional
dummy is assigned on the basis of judgment, including industries of ice cream and ice
(2024), fluid milk (2026), prepared feeds (2048), bread, cake, & related products
(2051), bottled and canned soft drinks (2086), and manufactured ice (2097).
To explore the differences between high and low advertising intensive industries,
we segmented the full sample (240 observations) into two groups by using
advertising-to-sales (A/S) ratio and conducted the above-mentioned analysis on
each subgroup. Group 1 was high advertising industries, in which their A/S ratios
were greater than 0.25% for all Census years. Group 1 included 140 observations.
The rest of the observations were classified as low advertising.2 Table 2 gives the
means for key variables based on full sample and both groups. The mean CR4 is
quite a bit higher in the high advertising group compared to the low advertising
group. This is consistent with Sutton’s (1991) theory that advertising is a viable
2Our examination on the robustness showed that there is no change in the subsamples used for high and
low advertisers as long as the critical level of A/S ratio is less than 0.35%.
TABLE 1. Concentration in Food and Tobacco Processing Industries, 1972–1992
CR4
Change Change
SIC Name 1972 1982 1992 1972–82 1982–92
2011 Meat packing plant products 26 27 50 1 23
2013 Sausages & prepared meats 16 15 25 1 10
2021 Butter 37 29 49 8 20
2022 Cheese, natural and processed 40 35 42 5 7
2023 Condensed and evaporated milk 34 33 43 1 10
2024 Ice cream and ices 27 22 24 5 2
2026 Fluid milk 17 15 22 2 7
2032 Canned specialties 62 59 69 3 10
2033 Canned fruits and vegetables 18 20 27 2 7
2034 Dehydrated fruits, vegetables, soups 31 41 39 10 2
2035 Pickles, sauces, salad dressings 30 40 41 10 1
2037 Frozen fruits and vegetables 28 28 28 0 0
2038 Frozen specialties 36 31 40 5 9
2041 Flour & other grain mill products 32 40 56 8 16
2043 Cereal breakfast foods 84 86 85 2 1
2044 Milled rice and byproducts 42 44 50 2 6
2045 Prep. flour mixes & refrigerated doughs 62 62 39 0 23
2046 Wet corn milling 63 73 73 10 0
2047 Dog, cat, and other pet food 50 50 58 0 8
2048 Prepared feeds, n.e.c. 22 19 23 3 4
2051 Bread, cake, & related products 27 32 34 5 2
2052 Cookies and crackers 58 59 56 1 3
2061 Sugar cane mill products 43 41 52 2 11
2062 Refined cane sugar 58 65 85 7 20
2063 Refined beet sugar 66 67 71 1 4
2066 Chocolate and cocoa products 72 69 75 3 6
2067 Chewing guma 84 87 96 3 9
2074 Cottonseed oil mill products 42 50 62 8 12
2075 Soybean oil mill products 52 56 71 4 15
2076 Vegetable oil mill products, n.e.c. 45 49 89 4 40
2077 Animal and marine fats and oils 17 24 37 7 13
2079 Shortening and cooking oils 40 40 35 0 5
2082 Malt beverages 52 78 90 26 12
2083 Malt and malt byproducts 49 61 65 12 4
2084 Wines, brandy, and brandy spirits 52 52 54 0 2
2085 Distilled liquor, except brandy 50 46 62 4 16
2086 Bottled and canned soft drinks 14 15 37 1 22
2087 Flavoring extracts & syrups n.e.c. 62 61 69 1 8
2091 Canned & cured seafood inc soup 38 44 29 6 15
2092 Fresh or frozen packaged fish 21 13 19 8 6
2095 Roasted coffee 64 66 66 2 0
2097 Manufactured ice 29 17 24 12 7
2098 Macaroni and spaghetti 34 37 78 3 41
2099 Food preparations, n.e.c. 26 29 22 3 7
2111 Cigarettes 84 90 93 6 3
2121 Cigars 55 58 74 3 16
barrier to entry. Simple t-ratios indicate that CR4, PCM, MES, and KO have
statistically different means in the two samples. The mean PCM in the high
advertising group is almost twice the mean from the low advertising group.
4. RESULTS
Three pretests revealed important findings and led to modifications in the estimation
procedures for the system defined in Equations 2 to 4. Autocorrelation was detected
using a modified Durbin-Watson test useful for panel data (Bhargava, Franzini, &
Narendranathan, 1982). The Breusch-Pagan test detected cross-sectional hetero-
scedasticity. Following the procedures in Beck and Katz (1995), we first correct for
autocorrelation assuming a first-order autoregressive process for each industry and
then adjust the error terms for cross-section heteroscedasticity to attain panel
corrected standard errors (PCSE). The heteroscedasticity adjustments are similar to
TABLE 1. Continued
CR4
Change Change
SIC Name 1972 1982 1992 1972–82 1982–92
2131 Chewing, smoking tobacco, snuff 60 75 87 15 12
2141 Tobacco stemming and redrying 66 68 72 2 4
means for SIC 20-21 44.10 46.21 53.90 2.10 7.69
Note: The data source was the Census of Manufactures. CR45 industry concentration; SIC5 standard
industrial classification; n.e.c.5not elsewhere classified.
aThe 1992 CR4 for SIC 2067 is estimated by the authors.
TABLE 2. Means for Selected Variables in Food and Tobacco Industries, 1972–1992
Full Group 1: Group 2:
Variable sample High advertisinga Low advertising
Sample size 240 140 100
CR4 (%) 48.00 52.27 42.03
(21.14) (20.72) (20.36)
A/S (%) 1.94 3.19 0.19
(2.84) (3.16) (0.30)
PCM (%) 33.09 40.81 22.28
(14.45) (12.14) (9.29)
Value of shipments ($B)b 7.89 8.01 7.73
(1.19) (1.06) (1.34)
MES (%) 3.82 4.34 3.09
(4.88) (5.57) (3.61)
KO (%) 31.63 27.93 36.81
(20.42) (9.83) (28.71)
Note: CR45 industry concentration; A/S5 advertising-to-sales ratio; PCM5price-cost margin; $B5bil-
lions of dollars; MES5minimum efficient scale; KO5 capital-output ratio.
aA/S ratios were greater than 0.25% for all (5) census years. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
bAll corresponding group means are different at the 5% level except those of Value of shipments.
Dependent
CR4 AD PCM
variable Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Constant 24.7792 6.1930 0.4880 0.1139 1.1721 3.7817
CR4 0.0616 1.9605 0.0193 6.0014
CR42 0.0002 1.1352
AD1 1.6169 2.0303

AD 0.0053 0.9037
PCM1 6.9903 3.5398

PCM 2.2755 0.1318
MES1 1.4413 4.6605

MES 1.3269 4.1965 0.0434 7.5831
KO1 0.1685 1.5415
KO 0.0036 3.6152
GR 2.6322 0.6458 0.8004 2.3219
NL 0.4151 6.0471
Year 2.7744 7.7752 0.4764 3.7999 0.0261 2.5550
Note: Subscript15 lagged one period. CR45 industry concentration; AD5 advertising; PCM5price-
cost margin; MES5minimum efficient scale; KO5 capital-output ratio; GR5 output growth;
NL5dummy for a local or regional industry.
Denotes significance at 10% level.
Denotes significance at 5% level.
White’s robust standard errors, but consider the time-series cross-sectional 
arrangement of the data as well. For the third pretest, pairwise correlation analysis 
revealed that PCM and lagged PCM were highly collinear. Thus, it seems that 
almost all of the variability in profitability occurred cross-sectionally. Initial 
estimates of the base model indicated this collinearity may not allow for a fair 
hypothesis test critical to this analysis: that increased lagged and/or current 
profitability lead to higher levels of concentration. Dropping one of the variables in 
this case represents a viable option, but theory cannot say which one should remain. 
Though not reported in a table, the coefficients on both variables yield the same 
statistical results and nearly the same parameter values when the opposing variable is 
dropped. Given the agnostic stance of either variable to the overall model result, we 
chose to use PCM, obtained from (PCMt þ PCMt1)/2, in the CR4 equation for all 
the models estimated.
4.1. Base Model
Table 3 contains the estimation results using the entire dataset. For concentration 
(Equation 2), we found that lagged advertising is responsible for increasing industry 
concentration, supporting the widely held TS belief that firms will build entry 
barriers when they can. Although the PCM variable was not significant, very 
interesting findings emerge about this variable in the subsequent regressions that use 
partitioned data. We found that increases in lagged MES and current MES were 
statistically significant and positive. These findings support the TS views that 
structure is influenced by technical scale economies in the production process. The 
time trend in the CR4 equation is positive and significant. This finding is consistent
TABLE 3. Two-stage Least Squares Estimates of Simultaneous Equations With PCSE
with the notion that all increases to the average concentration ratio cannot be
explained by the structural variables introduced in our model.3
For the advertising (Equation 3), we found that the industry conduct (advertising)
is affected positively and linearly by industry structure (concentration): The
coefficient on CR42 is not statistically significant. Thus, our findings support
the linear specification used by Kambhampati (1996) and DKKV and we reject the
hypothesis of an inverted U shape effect suggested by Greer (1971), Cable (1972),
and Strickland and Weiss (1976). Advertising is also found to be explained by past
price-cost margins. This finding serves to suggest that advertising, financed or
motivated by profits, may be used to create future barriers to entry. Interestingly, the
industry growth does not affect advertising. The result seems to suggest a life-cycle
effect on advertising, that is, fluctuations in sales do not change the advertising
decisions. Instead, the advertising expenditure appears to be planned according to
market shares and past profits.
The trend variable was negative and statistically significant. Inclusion of the trend
variable does not carry a specific hypothesis test. The negative and significant sign is
best interpreted as the model capturing a factor outside our theoretical setup. To
speculate, at least two possible reasons exist that might explain this outcome. First,
firms eager to increase their in-store brand strength may have opted for greater
promotion efforts through displays and/or paying for premier shelf location.
Because our data do not contain these sorts of advertising costs, a negative trend
variable could be explaining why firms have simply shifted away from typical media
advertising to a portfolio of promotional strategies. Second, with the strong
theoretical links fully exposed between both concentration and lagged profits on
advertising intensity, our negative trend variable may, in part, be picking up some of
the mitigating effects that sustained profitability and market position may have in
making the advertising decision. Simply put, firms in a strong position with erected
entry barriers may back off their pursuit of even greater power.
Turning next to the estimation of price-cost margins (Equation 4), industry
concentration is shown to have a positive impact on price-cost margins; i.e.,
industries with higher concentration ratios tend to be more profitable. This is a key
result supporting the TS view that mergers leading to higher concentration should be
taken seriously. Surprisingly, current period advertising was found to be insignificant
in explaining current profitability, suggesting that firms see advertising in a longer-
run capacity. This result is similar to Imel and Heimberger (1971), Nagle (1981), and
DKKV, where no specific relationship can be inferred between advertising and price-
cost margins.
3We also evaluated a regression model for the entire dataset that replaced the time trend variable with
fixed effects for each of the census years. The signs on the regression parameters did not change and only
small changes in the magnitudes of the parameter estimates were noted. However, theMES variable in the
CR4 equation and the CR4 variable in the AD equation were no longer significant. Although no strong
theoretical justification can support either approach, we believe that the use of a time trend variable
represents a superior approach. The intent of the time trend variable was to capture trends such as
technology, demand for healthier foods, etc., that are hard to quantify. It appears to that collinearity
between these dummy variables and the MES term in the CR4 equation and/or CR4 variable in the AD
equation causes a loss of power in explaining key relationships in the model. Thus, we opted not to pursue
the fixed effects model as a base model or in specifying the models with low and high advertising.
Two variables, capital expenditure (KO) and minimum efficient scale (MES) 
inversely affected the price-cost margin, which is similar to the findings in DKKV, 
but not with others in the literature (see for example, Strickland & Weiss, 1976). 
Nevertheless, this result is consistent with the idea that time and monetary 
investments to adjust the firm size and its balance sheet may damage profitability at 
the margin. It is worth pointing out that full marginal impacts of MES include the 
feedback effects that MES has on concentration. Thus, dPCM ¼ @PCM
dMES @MES
þ @PCM @CR4 ¼ 0:0434 þ 0:0193  1:3269  0:0178. The result remains statistically
@CR4 @MES
significant, but is only about 40% of the magnitude that the stand-alone MES 
parameter has on PCM.
The coefficient on the local/regional dummy variable (NL) was positive and 
significant. This implies those industries defined to sell in the local or regional market 
are more profitable than industries operating on a national or international scale. 
This is a key result because it insists that national concentration ratios are 
insufficient to describe how all markets are structured.
4.2. Partitioned Results
Table 4a and b contain the two-stage least squares results after partitioning the data 
in the manner discussed earlier and presented in Table 2. For the high advertising 
system of equations, unsurprising results emerge. Higher margins and lagged MES 
both led to higher levels of concentration. Thus, CS notions about performance (i.e., 
PCM) feedback effects on structure are supported. Lagged advertising was 
insignificant in explaining concentration, so we could not confirm if the feedback 
effects from conduct changed the industry structure. Increased concentration 
statistically explained higher levels of advertising within the high advertising group 
of industries, which implies that firms try to enhance entry barriers to preserve 
market power. Supporting the TS theory, the coefficient on concentration led to 
higher price-cost margins. In addition, parameters on minimum efficient scale and 
capital outlays were negative and significant. It appears that high advertising food 
industries were quick to respond to firm size and capitalization issues even though 
the marginal effects were negative. Finally, strong statistical support was found for 
the local/regional dummy variable indicating firms selling highly advertised goods in 
nonnational markets benefited from higher margins. Overall, these results are not 
much different from the results obtained by Kambhampati (1996) where both CS 
and TS effects were noted throughout the system. The results were also not very 
different from the results in Table 3 cover the entire range of industries.
The results for the low advertising industries were strikingly different. First, we 
found that lower price-cost margins led to higher concentration, a result that 
strongly supports a standard CS argument: The most profitable firms are likely to 
increase their market presence in industries where tight margins force inefficient 
firms to exit. The coefficients on the firm size (MES and lagged MES) and lagged 
capital outlays were all positive and significant. These results suggest a strong effect 
from increasing firm size and capitalization leading to greater concentration.
Only the coefficient on lagged profitability was significant in explaining 
advertising. In low advertising industries, concentration is highly insignificant and 
does not explain changes in advertising. Turning now to the performance equation, 
interesting and striking results emerged. Increased concentration led to lower
industrial profits, not higher as suggested by TS theory. The results strongly suggest
this group of industries is under significant competitive pressure, leading to
consolidation and firm exit. Thus, despite the increased consolidation, firms were
not able to use the improved structure to their benefit. Low advertising industries
face the challenge of selling potentially close substitutes that do not benefit much
from a brand identity. It appears that concentration levels are not sufficiently high
enough to warrant concern about market power on prices during the years of this
study.
TABLE 4.
Dependent
CR4 AD PCM
Variable Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
(a) Two-stage Least Squares Estimates for High Advertising Group
Constant 13.0340 1.4155 13.7604 0.9769 0.6293 3.1463
CR4 0.1073 2.3675 0.0169 10.5671
CR42 0.0002 0.7169
AD1 0.8159 1.4664
AD 0.0082 2.0325
PCM1 1.7877 0.4039
PCM 48.9709 1.7572
MES1 2.3088 4.2464

MES 0.0386 0.0695 0.0313 8.4350
KO1 0.1767 0.8776
KO 0.0048 6.6506
GR 14.3478 1.1235 0.4065 2.3024
NL 0.3404 8.2328
Year 1.1699 1.5178 0.5191 2.3636 0.0115 3.6985
(b) Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates for Low Advertising Group
Constant 35.8070 4.5578 0.8055 0.9101 0.4842 6.4864
CR4 0.0037 0.8995 0.0082 6.3504
CR42 0.0000 0.6854
AD1 6.7087 0.6362
AD 0.1001 3.2718
PCM1 1.1196 2.0887

PCM 62.8087 1.7747
MES1 1.9798 2.5470

MES 1.6209 2.6913 0.0202 5.3726
KO1 0.1684 1.6706

KO 0.0034 12.3877
GR 0.8273 1.0511 0.7933 8.4636
NL 0.1079 3.6455
Year 2.9772 2.6483 0.0340 0.9633 0.0328 6.8125
Note: Subscript15 lagged one period. CR45 industry concentration; AD5 advertising; PCM5 price-
cost margin; MES5 minimum efficient scale; KO5 capital-output ratio; GR5 output growth;
NL5 dummy for a local or regional industry.
Denotes significance at 10% level.
Denotes significance at 5% level.
Table 5a and b contain elasticity information from the high and low advertising
industries, respectively. It is interesting to compare the magnitude of change between
each structure, conduct, and performance variable. For the high advertising
industries a major finding is that the impact of increasing concentration on profit
is over 5 times larger in magnitude than the impact of profit on concentration
(2.1493/0.37595 5.72; t-ratio5 1.73). This finding is supported statistically and casts
serious doubt on the belief that market structure is a benign feature in an efficient
and competitive market process. Clearly, increased concentration has a significant
economic effect on performance and this result supports the long-held traditional
school of thought. Additionally, the elasticity of concentration on advertising was
statistically significant, but the reverse relationship (i.e., lagged advertising on
concentration) is not significant. This result suggests strongly that market structure
TABLE 5.
CR4 AD PCM
(a) Elasticities in Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates for High Advertising Group
CR4 2.1652 2.1493
AD1 0.0499
AD 0.0632
PCM1 0.2209
PCM 0.3759
MES1 0.1900

MES 0.0031 0.3216
KO1 0.0924
KO 0.3161
GR 4.6287 1.3081
(b) Elasticities in Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates for Low Advertising Group
CR4 0.3940 1.5417
AD1 0.0299
AD 0.0794
PCM1 1.3572

PCM 0.3275
MES1 0.1512

MES 0.1080 0.0993
KO1 0.1427

KO 0.5288
GR 4.7449 3.9856
Note: eAD,CR45 (b312b4CR4t)CR4t/ADt. Its standard error is 0.4352 for (a) or 0.6179 for (b). ePCM,MES
includes an indirect effect through CR4. Its standard error is 0.0383 for (a) or 0.0340 for (b). ePCM,GR
includes an indirect effect through AD. Its standard error is 0.4110 for (a) or 0.3681 for (b).
Subscript15 lagged one period. CR45 industry concentration; AD5 advertising; PCM5 price-cost
margin; MES5 minimum efficient scale; KO5 capital-output ratio; GR5 output growth.
Denotes significance at 10% level.
Denotes significance at 5% level.
(i.e., concentration) is a much more powerful driver in shaping industries than does
market conduct.
For the low advertising industry elasticities (Table 5b), a similar dominance
emerges in that structure has much larger impacts on conduct and performance than
the reverse effects. However, neither concentration’s effect on advertising nor lagged
advertising’s effect on concentration were statistically supported. This is not
surprising given the lesser role of advertising in these industries. Additionally,
concentration’s effect on performance is not positively related. Thus, the most
obvious conclusion is one consistent with CS underpinnings. In industries with
tightening margins, performance informs market participants to restructure as
perhaps an act of survival. For the years of this study, low advertising firms were
simply unable to translate improved market structure into better margins.
The results from each of the three regressions informed us to consider a quadratic
PCM term in the CR4 equation and to use the whole dataset. This allowed us to test
the hypothesis that both very high and very low performance sends the strongest
signal to restructure the industry toward higher concentration. We ran this
regression and report only the relevant information on the quadratic terms with
standard errors reported below each coefficient:4
CR4 ¼ ::: 146:86PCM þ 241:45PCM2:::
ð46:67Þ ð70:78Þ ð5Þ
Here, we find statistical support that both the most negative and positive PCMs sent
the strongest signals for industry restructuring. Coincidentally, the minimum point
of the U-shaped relationship (0.304) occurs close to the mean of PCM data (0.331),
which certainly explains the opposing signs on the PCM coefficients from the
partitioned regression. This result is suggestive that functional relationships
spanning the cross section matter a great deal and that working with more
homogeneous groups of industries is advisable.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this study, we explore the intertemporal and feedback interrelations among
dependent variables of structure, conduct, and performance for 48 four-digit SIC
food and tobacco processing industries during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Using an
intertemporal simultaneous-equation framework provided a unique backdrop for
comparisons between Chicago School and Traditionalist School views about
industrial organization and antitrust enforcement. The model was estimated with
entire dataset and with the data partitioned between high and low advertising
industries. The models were coded in GAUSS and estimated using two-stage least
squares with the structure (concentration) conduct (advertising) and performance
(price-cost margins) assumed endogenous. All of the exogenous variables served as
instruments in the first-stage estimations.
We can summarize our finding around five major points. First, clearly and
convincingly, the CS point that performance informs the industry about how to
4The regression results for the advertising and PCM equations are identical to the results in Table 3. The
unreported coefficients in the CR4 equation are quite robust and maintain the same statistical significance
found in the first column of Table 3.
structure was supported in both partitioned data estimations and in an auxiliary 
regression allowing for U-shaped performance effects on concentration. In the low 
advertising set of industries, as performance worsened, concentration pushed higher. 
This presumably suggests consolidation occurred to avoid economic losses. The 
explanation is also supported in the performance equation where increasing 
concentration was correlated with tighter PCMs. In high advertising industries, 
higher PCMs led to higher and statistically significant levels of concentration. The 
partitioned regressions and the auxiliary regression show that performance impacts 
on structure follow a U-shaped pattern: performance signals leading to restructuring 
are strongest in the highest and lowest performing industries.
Second, support for the TS point that exogenous forces shape both the structure 
and performance of the industry was evident in all the estimations. Minimum 
efficient scale, lagged minimum efficient scale, and lagged capital outlay were 
positive and mostly significant factors that led to higher industry concentration.
Third, the TS reference to structural linkages to performance was strongly supported 
in the all-industry regression, in the regression involving high advertising industries, 
and in the comparative elasticity analysis. Most revealing was the elasticity analysis, 
which showed that structure affects advertising levels and industry performance much 
more than the reverse effects. In particular, structural impacts on performance were 
over 5 times higher in magnitude than performance impacts had on structure.
Fourth, support was found in the full sample and in high advertising partition for 
the theory that local and regional firms enjoy higher levels of performance compared 
to national firms. Clearly, antitrust authorities should continue to pay close attention 
to relevant markets when evaluating acquisitions.
Fifth, and finally, in this article we took no parochial stand in placing favor with 
either the Chicago or the Traditionalist School of thought. Our results find elements 
of support in both viewpoints. In particular, the strong statistical support for 
performance informing structure was balanced with support for structure leading to 
increased performance. However, from an economic impact point of view, the 
magnitude of these effects is far more supportive of the traditionalist view when 
confronting the high advertising group of industries.
To conclude, cross-sectional industrial organization research such as this study 
provides useful policy-relevant results and paints a broad picture of the economic 
landscape. Our results point clearly to recommendations about mergers. Horizontal 
mergers should be carefully scrutinized and challenged when performance levels are 
high and/or products are branded through heavy advertising. Industries in decline or 
selling products in which firm prices are not protected by brands or other forms of 
differentiation may need a green light to restructure quickly. A more updated 
assessment of the U.S. food industry should include data from the more recent 
Census of Manufactures. However, changes in industry classification systems and 
availability of advertising data limited our scope to 1992 as the final year. The U.S. 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system was changed in 1997 to the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS). The problem of matching data 
between these two classification systems is not difficult; however, it is not yet clear 
that the new classification system is a superior way to define the relevant industry 
boundaries. Additionally, organizing advertising data by industry remains an 
arduous and expensive task. Despite the hurdles, our research is suggestive that
updated studies of this nature do a good job of informing policy makers and
antitrust authorities about overall competitive condition in the U.S. food sector.
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